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FAMILY VALUES: THE CHILD CITIZENSHIP 
ACT’S ABILITY TO PROTECT THE 
FOREIGN-BORN CHILDREN OF U.S. 
CITIZENS FROM DEPORTATION 
Abstract: On March 19, 2019, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Duncan v. 
Barr held, as a matter of first impression, that the physical custody requirement of 
the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 is a mixed question of law and fact and thus re-
quires more than clear error review by an appellate body. In so doing, the court re-
jected broad deference to immigration judges on the question of physical custody 
and permitted greater independent judgment by appellate bodies. This Comment 
argues that, although the Fourth Circuit correctly ruled on the proper standard of 
review, it missed an opportunity to correct a line of precedent and regulation misin-
terpreting the language of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 and its original intent. 
INTRODUCTION 
The values driving immigration policy in the United States have shifted 
throughout history.1 At the founding of the country and into the early nine-
teenth century, a need to fill the vast countryside resulted in a more welcoming 
stance toward immigration.2 This stance was followed by a history of pendu-
lum swings.3 Attitudes have shifted between desires to exclude immigrants, 
often because of their perceived negative effects on the country’s ethnic 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See SUSAN F. MARTIN, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 1–3 (2011) (providing a framework for 
seeing the history of immigration in the United States through four waves and three models based on 
colonial justifications for welcoming immigrants). 
 2 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLI-
CY 4–7 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing how the desire for more immigrants was a platform of the Declara-
tion of Independence and that labor was needed to settle the frontier and push out the American Indi-
ans). Immigrants were largely welcomed until the immigrant makeup shifted Catholic with the arrival 
of Irish and German Catholics in the 1830s. Id. at 6–7. 
 3 See id. at 7–10, 17–18, 19–21 (providing examples of shifts in attitudes between anti-immigrant 
rhetoric and more welcoming views). A more open stance towards immigrants at the country’s found-
ing was followed by an anti-immigrant period fueled by Protestant-Catholic divisions and the arrival 
of German and Irish Catholic immigrants. Id. at 7. This anti-immigrant view gave way to a more open 
posture in the mid-to-late nineteenth century as the need for labor increased with the rise of the rail-
roads. Id. at 9. Reactive sentiments followed as U.S. society viewed the new wave of immigrants as 
even more different, and thus more undesirable, than the prior ones. Id. Attitudes again shifted around 
World War II as labor needs increased during the war and humanitarian sentiments towards refugees 
increased when the war ended after uncovering Nazi atrocities. Id. at 17–18. These positive attitudes, 
however, quickly contended with rising Communism fears that extended to immigrants. Id. at 19. 
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makeup, and being welcoming towards immigrants, because of labor needs or 
growing acceptance of an immigrant group.4 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Amendments of 1965 estab-
lished the foundation of the modern regime of U.S. immigration policy.5 The 
INA Amendments eliminated quotas based on maintaining the existing ethnic 
makeup in the country and emphasized welcoming immigrants with trade 
skills or with family members already in the United States.6 Immigration poli-
cy since 1990 has retained this preference for supporting family reunification 
by reserving 480,000 of the annual cap of 675,000 immigrant visas for family-
sponsored immigrants.7 Advocates of an immigration system based on family 
ties specifically recognize the valuable support structure that family provides 
in allowing immigrants to flourish when they arrive in the United States.8 The 
Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA or the Act) built on this policy preference 
by easing the process by which adopted children and children born to U.S. citi-
zens outside of the United States became citizens upon entering the country.9 
In the late 2010s, as attacks on “chain migration” and birthright citizen-
ship have coincided with public outcry against family separations and deten-
tion at the southern border, questions arise of how much valuing families in-
forms U.S. immigration policy and whether it is in the midst of another pendu-
lum swing.10 Amid this backdrop, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dun-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. at 7–10, 17–18, 19–21 (outlining the changing views on immigration over the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries). 
 5 See id. at 20–21 (describing a variety of modifications to immigration laws from the second half 
of the twentieth century but highlighting the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Amendments of 
1965 as bringing a new approach to immigration policy as a whole). 
 6 Id. National origin quotas went into effect in 1929, limiting the number of immigrants allowed 
in to the United States to 150,000 Europeans. Id. at 16. Quotas distributed this allotment to each na-
tionality based on the proportion of that European nationality present in the United States at the time 
of the 1890 census. Id. at 16. 
 7 WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43145, U.S. FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 2–3 (2018). 
 8 See id. at 23 (describing how having family in the United States provides new immigrants with 
support in a variety of ways). 
 9 See Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, § 101, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000) (mandat-
ing that a foreign-born child automatically acquires citizenship if one of the child’s parents is a U.S. 
citizen, the child is under eighteen years old, and the child is lawfully living in the United States in the 
“legal and physical custody” of the U.S. citizen parent); see also 146 CONG. REC. H7776–78 (daily 
ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statements of Rep. Smith, Rep. Jackson-Lee, and Rep. Delahunt) (explaining the 
bill’s purpose as creating an easier path for adoptees and foreign-born children of U.S. citizens to 
become citizens by eliminating administrative hurdles and bestowing citizenship automatically when 
specific criteria are met). 
 10 See, e.g., Caroline Holliday, Note, Making Domestic Violence Private Again: Referral Authori-
ty and Rights Rollback in Matter of A-B-, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2145, 2179 (2019) (reiterating anti-immi-
gration rhetoric of the Trump Administration, thereby providing evidence of another sharp swing in 
the country’s stance); Camila Domonoske & Richard Gonzales, What We Know: Family Separation 
and ‘Zero Tolerance’ at the Border, NPR (June 19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/6210
65383/what-we-know-family-separation-and-zero-tolerance-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/UNH3-
II.-246 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
can v. Barr confronted the issue of citizenship for Howard Duncan, the son of 
a Nigerian mother and U.S. citizen father.11 Duncan came to the United States 
when he was six to live with his father and, at the age of twenty-seven, faced 
deportation.12 
Part I of this Comment discusses recent changes to the standard of review 
applied to immigration decisions, provides an overview of the CCA, and re-
views the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
2019 in Duncan.13 Part II dives deeper into the reasoning of the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision and explores the rationale behind the outcome of the ruling.14 
Lastly, Part III asserts that the Fourth Circuit’s ruling was appropriate, but that 
it reveals the shortcomings of the CCA, and argues for legislative changes to 
better equip the Act to serve its intended purpose.15 
I. REVIEWING IMMIGRATION DECISIONS AND A CHILD’S  
CLAIM TO CITIZENSHIP 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provides the function of an ap-
pellate body to individuals challenging rulings from an immigration judge 
(IJ).16 As such, the BIA and the regulations that govern it set the basis for re-
view of immigration decisions.17 Section A of this Part discusses the standards 
                                                                                                                           
82U9] (detailing the Trump Administration’s policy of separating families who cross the U.S.-Mexico 
border without documentation, the legal basis for the policy, a comparison of the policy to Obama-era 
rules, the subsequent shift in policy to one that keeps families together in detention, and reactions 
from advocacy groups); Patrick J. Lyons, Trump Wants to Abolish Birthright Citizenship. Can He Do 
That?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/birthright-citizenship-
14th-amendment-trump.html [https://perma.cc/UTE7-HWQP] (analyzing the legal barriers to Presi-
dent Trump ending birthright citizenship, which is the automatic bestowal of U.S. citizenship to any-
one physically born in the United States, and explaining other terms related to the debate, including 
birth tourism, chain migration, and anchor babies); Linda Qiu, What Is ‘Chain Migration’? Here’s the 
Controversy Behind It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/politics/
the-facts-behind-the-weaponized-phrase-chain-migration.html [https://perma.cc/CHV9-AC8R] (defin-
ing “chain migration” as the process by which U.S. residents sponsor family members abroad for 
green cards and discussing the term’s evolution from a more academic term to a derogatory term that 
implies a flaw in the U.S. immigration system). 
 11 See Duncan v. Barr, 919 F.3d 209, 211–12, 217 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that the child of a U.S. 
citizen did not automatically receive citizenship upon residing with his U.S. citizen father in the Unit-
ed States and that his citizenship claim depended on whether Maryland law would consider him in the 
physical custody of his father while his father was imprisoned). 
 12 Id. at 211–12. 
 13 See infra notes 16–52 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 53–95 and accompanying text.. 
 15 See infra notes 96–125 and accompanying text. 
 16 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2019) (providing the structure and directives for the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA)). 
 17 See id. The BIA accepts appeals on a variety of decisions made by immigration judges (IJs), 
including decisions in exclusion, removal, and deportation proceedings. Id. § 1003.1(b). An individual 
can then appeal an adverse ruling from the BIA to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals via 
petition within thirty days of the BIA’s removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2) (2018). 
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of review that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied to immigration 
decisions and whether courts apply state or federal law to issues pertaining to 
domestic affairs.18 Section B provides an overview of the CCA and the facts 
and decision of Duncan’s case.19 
A. Standards Applied to the Review of Immigration Decisions 
Beginning in 2002, federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) began re-
quiring the BIA, the highest administrative appellate body on immigration 
matters, to review all factual matters with the more deferential clear error 
standard.20 Prior to this change, the BIA reviewed all matters, both factual and 
legal questions, with a de novo standard of review.21 
This change is reflected in the 2012 decision, Turkson v. Holder, where 
the Fourth Circuit examined the BIA’s review of an IJ’s decision to defer an 
immigrant’s deportation on the grounds that he would likely face torture in his 
home country of Ghana.22 The BIA overturned this determination after disre-
garding specific testimony that the immigrant and his brother gave to the IJ.23 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 20–31 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 32–52 and accompanying text. 
 20 Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (2019). 
Promulgated in 2002, the new rule replaced long-standing precedent that the BIA had the authority to 
review factual determinations of IJs using its own reasoning, also known as a de novo standard of review. 
See Matter of B-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 (BIA 1955) (stating that the BIA had the authority to determine 
matters of fact only subject to potential qualifications by the Attorney General); Board of Immigration 
Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,888 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3) (discussing how the BIA recognized its power to review entire immigration deci-
sions de novo, including factual determinations, in cases since Matter of B-). 
 21 Turkson, 667 F.3d at 527. The regulation instructs the BIA to continue to review legal ques-
tions de novo but to review factual matters with a clear error standard. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–
(ii). De novo review refers to an appellate body exercising independent judgment over a matter. Turk-
son, 667 F.3d at 527 (distinguishing between the two standards of review addressed in the regulation). 
Meanwhile, a clear error standard provides a high degree of deference to a prior determination. Id. In 
other words, under clear error review, an appellate body cannot exchange the lower court’s reasoning 
for its own and can only overrule the lower court in instances of unambiguous mistake. Easley v. 
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001). 
 22 See Turkson, 667 F.3d at 524, 527 (holding that the BIA erred by not reviewing the IJ’s deci-
sion according to the appropriate regulations). James Turkson immigrated to the United States in 
1995, fleeing state violence and torture in response to his activities supporting a political party that his 
father led. Id. Since coming to the United States, Turkson married and began to reside in a legal, per-
manent status. Id. Turkson was then convicted of a drug possession charge and faced deportation. Id. 
Turkson invoked the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) provisions as a defense against his removal because of the 
likelihood that he would again face torture by the hand of the state if he returned to Ghana. Id. at 524–
25. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights drafted the CAT to more effectively combat 
torture and other inhumane punishments globally. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85. 
 23 Turkson, 667 F.3d at 525. 
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The Fourth Circuit held that this constituted a de novo review of the IJ’s legal 
and factual determinations and thus violated federal regulations requiring a 
clear error standard for the review of factual determinations.24 In particular, the 
court explained that applying the clear error standard to factual determinations 
appropriately reflects the IJ’s proximity to the facts of the case, including the 
witnesses and evidence.25 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the BIA should 
have used a clear error standard of review because it mirrors the standard ap-
plied to any factfinder and was reflected in the new federal regulation.26 
On the other end of the spectrum, in 2017 in Upatcha v. Sessions, the 
Fourth Circuit held that the BIA inappropriately applied only the clear error 
standard when reviewing a “mixed question of fact and law.”27 The court held 
that to determine whether a marriage was in “good faith” requires an appellate 
body to examine the facts for clear error but to use a de novo standard to re-
view how those facts apply to the law.28 
In both Turkson and Upatcha, the Fourth Circuit faced mixed questions of 
law and fact.29 In Turkson, the court held that the BIA contravened federal reg-
ulations pertaining to BIA standards of review by applying a de novo standard 
to the mixed question, and in Upatcha the court held that the BIA’s use of only 
a clear error standard violated the federal regulations.30 Accordingly, federal 
regulations pertaining to the review of immigration decisions frequently re-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. at 528. 
 25 Id. at 527. 
 26 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii)). 
 27 Upatcha v. Sessions, 849 F.3d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that when reviewing whether a 
marriage was in good faith for immigration purposes, the BIA must review the evidence for clear error 
but can review de novo the ultimate legal judgment based on that evidence). 
 28 Id. at 184. The petitioner, Juraluk Upatcha, sought to prove her marriage was in “good faith” 
for the purposes of gaining a hardship petition to prevent deportation. Id. at 183. Upatcha immigrated 
to the United States in 2008 as the fiancé of Sergio Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen. Id. at 182. By marrying 
Gonzalez, Upatcha obtained conditional legal residence status for two years, after which she could 
make the status permanent only if she and her husband petitioned that their marriage was still intact 
and was not for immigration purposes. Id. at 182–83. Unfortunately, three months after their marriage, 
Upatcha filed for divorce and, as a result, could be removed from the United States. Id. at 183. To 
avoid removal, she applied for a hardship waiver, which the Department of Homeland Security can 
issue at its discretion to allow individuals like Upatcha to stay in the United States if removal would 
cause the individual “extreme hardship” and the couple married in good faith, rather than on false 
pretenses. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (delineating the requirements for a hardship waiver as show-
ing that extreme hardship would result if the individual was removed and that the marriage was en-
tered into in good faith but terminated or that the spouse or child was subject to physical abuse or 
“extreme cruelty”). 
 29 Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 182; Turkson, 667 F.3d at 528. 
 30 Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 182, 184; Turkson, 667 F.3d at 528; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) 
(requiring the BIA to review factual determinations with a clear error standard and matters of law de 
novo). 
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quire applying a blended clear error and de novo review to mixed questions of 
law and fact.31 
B. The Fourth Circuit Examined “Physical Custody” as a Requirement for 
Deriving Citizenship Under the Child Citizenship Act of 2001 
The CCA, which went into effect in 2001, created an easier path for chil-
dren of U.S. citizens born abroad, including adopted children, to become citi-
zens when they meet specific criteria.32 More specifically, if a child perma-
nently lives in the United States, is under eighteen years old, has at least one 
parent who is a U.S. citizen, and is in the legal and physical custody of that 
parent, then the child automatically derives citizenship from that parent.33 
Congress originally drafted the bill as the Adopted Orphans Citizenship Act 
with the specific goal of eliminating the bureaucratic processes that often left 
adopted children as noncitizens even though the biological children of their 
adopted parents were citizens.34 Concerns for lack of fairness in how the law 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 184 (noting how federal regulations require a two-part approach that 
uses a clear error and de novo standard when analyzing an issue with questions of fact and law); Turk-
son, 667 F.3d at 527 (same); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (explaining the requirement that questions of 
law be reviewed de novo and question of fact be reviewed for clear error). 
 32 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (codifying the requirements of the Child Citizenship Act 
(CCA)); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: THE CHILD CITIZENSHIP ACT OF 2000, at 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter FACT SHEET] https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/ChildCitizenship
Act_120100.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5SB-H8W4] (providing an overview of the CCA); Eric Schmitt, 
Children Adopted Abroad Win Automatic Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2001), https://www.
nytimes.com/2001/02/27/us/children-adopted-abroad-win-automatic-citizenship.html [https://perma.
cc/L2X6-JZNG] (citing several stories of families with children adopted from abroad who automati-
cally became citizens with the passage of the CCA). The CCA was enacted on October 30, 2000, and 
went into effect on February 27, 2001. FACT SHEET, supra at 1. 
 33 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a); FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 1. 
 34 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 12 (2000) (highlighting that the grant of automatic citizenship to 
foreign-born children of U.S. citizens via the CCA corrects the disparity that the immigration system 
created between the children of U.S. citizens born domestically versus those born abroad); 146 CONG. 
REC. H7778 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Schakowsky) (referring to the CCA by its 
original name, the Adopted Orphans Citizenship Act, and explaining its intent to address the unfair-
ness of the immigration system’s failure to grant automatic citizenship to the adopted children of U.S. 
citizen parents). In the most extreme and concerning cases, parents would forget or not realize that 
they needed to go through the final process of naturalization for their adopted children, only to have 
them face serious consequences including deportation. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 5; 146 CONG. 
REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (acknowledging the burden creat-
ed by the added bureaucratic step of naturalizing a newly adopted child and the complications that 
arise for the child later in life if this step is overlooked or mishandled); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(23) (defining “naturalization” as “the conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after 
birth, by any means whatsoever”); 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (explaining the requirements for naturalization). 
Specifically, Representative Delahunt shared the story of Joao Herbert, a boy who was adopted by 
U.S. parents from his birth-country of Brazil and grew up in Ohio. 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. 
Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt). At age twenty-two, Herbert was deported for a relative-
ly minor drug offense because he never naturalized when he was under eighteen years old. Id.; Mari-
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would create an easier path to citizenship for foreign-born adopted children but 
not the biological children of U.S. citizens who were born abroad led to the 
law’s extension to all children who were born abroad, brought to the United 
States, and in the “legal and physical custody” of the U.S. citizen parent.35 
Prior to its 2019 decision in Duncan v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit had not 
ruled on the standard of review or whether to apply state or federal law to the 
CCA’s physical custody requirement.36 Howard Duncan, the son of a U.S. citi-
zen father and a Nigerian mother, challenged the standard of review that the 
BIA used when determining whether he met the physical custody require-
ment.37 When Duncan was six years old, he and his grandmother moved to the 
United States from Nigeria to live with his father.38 Three months later, Dun-
can’s father became incarcerated and remained so until 2011, at which point 
Duncan was twenty years old.39 Duncan’s grandmother assumed legal guardi-
                                                                                                                           
lyn Miller & Gina Mace, Deported Man Shot to Death in Brazil, AKRON BEACON J. (May 27, 2004), 
https://www.beaconjournal.com/article/20140527/NEWS/305279172/ [https://perma.cc/EZ9C-5QU2].  
 35 H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 5. Further, an earlier version of the bill had the effect of granting 
citizenship to these children retroactively at the time of their birth. See id. (describing how the bill was 
subsequently corrected to ensure citizenship was not granted retroactively to when individuals were 
born). Concerns from the Department of Justice and the Department of State, particularly as the law 
related to adoptees and foreign relations with their countries of origin, led Congress to apply an effec-
tive date to the bill, rather than granting citizenship retroactively at the time of birth. See In re Rodri-
guez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. 153, 168 (BIA 2001) (Rosenberg, J. concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (explaining that the legislative history shows concern from the Executive Departments and 
members of Congress towards extending citizenship retroactively); H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 9–11 
(2000) (noting concerns including foreign affairs challenges and new claims for certain entitlements 
from the time of birth). This clause, manifested in 8 C.F.R. § 320.2, requires individuals to meet all of 
the CCA’s conditions on or after February 27, 2001, to qualify for automatic citizenship. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 320.2. Recognizing the negative effect this cut-off had on granting citizenship to adoptees who were 
older than eighteen when the law went into effect, members of Congress have introduced corrective leg-
islation. See H.R. 2731, 116th Cong. (2019) (as referred to the Subcomm. on Immigration and Citizen-
ship, June 26, 2019) (allowing individuals who were eighteen years old or older as of February 27, 
2001, to obtain automatic citizenship if they previously met the CCA’s requirements); Sasha-Ann Si-
mons, Adoptees at Risk of Deportation Bring Fight to Washington, WAMU (May 15, 2019), https://
wamu.org/story/19/05/15/adoptees-at-risk-of-deportation-bring-fight-to-washington/ [https://perma.
cc/X45B-P4QQ] (explaining that the new bill permits individuals who were adopted but were also 
adults at the time of the CCA’s passage to take advantage of its grant of automatic citizenship). The 
proposed legislation, however, focuses only on adoptees and is driven by the aging-out issue, rather than 
the exclusionary effects of having only met other attendant circumstances, such as physical custody, on or 
after February 27, 2001. See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212 (providing Duncan as an example of an individ-
ual who did not meet one of the CCA’s requirements, other than age, after the effective date, but had 
met all three requirements beforehand); Simons, supra (highlighting efforts for corrective legislative 
focusing on adoptees who were over eighteen years old after the legislation’s effective date). 
 36 See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 214, 216 (stating explicitly that the standard of review was a matter of 
first impression and implying that whether to apply state or federal law to the meaning of physical 
custody in the CCA had not yet been addressed). 
 37 Id. at 211. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. To obtain automatic citizenship under the CCA, an individual must legally reside in the 
United States and be in the legal and physical custody of his or her U.S. citizen parent while younger 
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anship shortly after his father’s imprisonment, but his father remained involved 
in his life.40 Particularly, while his father was incarcerated, Duncan visited him 
once a month and spoke with him on the phone multiple times a week.41 Addi-
tionally, his father participated in various life decisions, small and large, and 
provided some financial support to the family.42 
In February 2015, the Department of Homeland Security brought removal 
proceedings against Duncan for crimes he previously committed.43 Duncan 
moved to dismiss the deportation proceedings on the grounds that he was a 
U.S. citizen.44 The IJ found that Duncan was not a U.S. citizen because he was 
not in his father’s custody during the time required by the statute and therefore 
entered a final removal order.45 
Following the IJ’s decision, Duncan appealed to the BIA.46 The BIA held 
that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Duncan failed to meet the physical 
custody requirement of the CCA.47 Duncan then appealed to the Fourth Cir-
                                                                                                                           
than eighteen years old. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a). Therefore, by the time Duncan’s father left prison, Dun-
can no longer met the CCA’s age requirement because he was over eighteen. See id.; Duncan, 919 
F.3d at 211. 
 40 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 211–12. 
 41 Id. at 212. 
 42 Id. Decisions about raising Duncan included where he would go to school, what sports he could 
play, and what clothing his grandmother would purchase for him. Id. 
 43 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (stating that aliens who commit certain criminal offenses are 
deportable). Duncan was convicted of four crimes between October 2008 and January 2011, including 
an aggravated felony, two crimes of moral turpitude, and a firearm offense. Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212. 
 44 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212. A criminal offense only warrants deportation under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2) if the individual committing the offense is an alien, and thus would not require deporta-
tion of Duncan if he established U.S. citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (establishing that 
aliens are deportable); id. § 1101(a)(3) (2014) (defining “alien” as any noncitizen or anyone not a 
national of the United States); Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212; Ojo v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 533, 535 (4th Cir. 
2019) (reviewing the statutes that apply to individuals facing deportation). In 2009, before he turned 
eighteen, Duncan had applied for a certificate of citizenship. Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212. In March 2010, 
however, his application was denied. Id. He appealed and, in February 2015, the Administrative Appeals 
Office affirmed the denial on the grounds that Duncan failed to establish that he had been in the physical 
custody of a U.S. citizen parent. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (stating that a child born outside of the 
United States automatically becomes a citizen if at least one parent is a citizen, the child is under 
eighteen years old, and the child is in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen 
parent). Given the denial of citizenship, the government commenced removal proceedings against him. 
Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212.  
 45 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212. The IJ reasoned that Duncan did not meet the physical custody re-
quirement because his father was not physically caring for or supervising him. Id. at 213. According-
ly, because Duncan did not meet the third prong of 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a), the IJ concluded that he was 
not a citizen and thus lacked protection from deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). Duncan, 919 
F.3d at 212–13; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (holding that aliens convicted of criminal offenses includ-
ing crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and certain firearm offenses are deportable); id. 
§ 1431(a) (granting automatic citizenship to a child born outside of the United States if three criteria 
are met, one of which includes residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of a U.S. 
citizen parent). 
 46 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 213. 
 47 Id. 
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cuit, challenging the BIA’s use of clear error review for determining whether 
he was in his father’s physical custody.48 
In a matter of first impression, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the BIA 
applied the wrong standard to a review of the CCA’s physical custody re-
quirement.49 The court reasoned that, because physical custody is a question of 
both law and fact, the BIA should have reviewed the factual determination with 
a clear error standard and the legal application de novo pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(3).50 Moreover, the court concluded that state law, rather than feder-
al law, should provide the legal meaning of “physical custody.”51 Accordingly, 
the Fourth Circuit remanded Duncan’s case to the BIA with instructions to re-
view the IJ’s factual decision for clear error and the legal determination with 
de novo review, using Maryland’s definition of “physical custody.”52 
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DEMANDS MORE FROM BIA REVIEWS,  
BUT LESS FROM THE CHILD CITIZENSHIP ACT 
In 2019, in Duncan v. Barr, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit decided as a matter of first impression that the physical custody 
requirement of the CCA is a blended question of fact and law.53 The court fur-
ther held that the BIA should look to the applicable state’s law for the defini-
tion of “physical custody.”54 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning reflects previous 
decisions on similar questions, such as the legitimacy of a good-faith marriage 
and the definition of “torture” in relation to an immigration-status determina-
tion.55 Section A of this Part provides an in-depth analysis of the Fourth Cir-
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 213–14. 
 49 Id. at 214. 
 50 Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (defining the standard of review protocols for the 
BIA). The BIA previously reviewed all determinations de novo, but in 2002, new regulations estab-
lished the review of facts for clear error, whereas all other issues remained subject to de novo review. 
See Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing the 2002 shift in review stand-
ards); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii). 
 51 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 216. The Fourth Circuit looked to its decision in Ojo v. Lynch, where the 
court held that federal immigration law should interpret adoption issues in accordance with state law 
because, as a principle of federalism, determinations on domestic matters belong in the realms of the 
states. Id.; see Ojo, 813 F.3d at 540–41 (holding that, given the judiciary’s long tradition of looking to 
state law for determinations on domestic issues, Congress would have had to explicitly provide a defini-
tion for “adoption” in the immigration statute if it intended for courts to ignore state law in determining 
the applicable definition of “adopted”). Accordingly, the court in Duncan held that the definition of “cus-
tody” is a domestic matter, and federal law should defer to the states for legal interpretation of the term. 
919 F.3d at 216. 
 52 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 217. 
 53 Duncan v. Barr, 919 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 54 Id. at 216. 
 55 See id. at 215 (explaining that the two-part review standard for mixed questions of law and fact 
parallels the approach taken in other immigration cases); Upatcha v. Sessions, 849 F.3d 181, 183–84 
(4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the details of a couple’s relationship—including their dating, the nature 
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cuit’s decision on the standard of review that the BIA should have applied.56 
Section B reviews the court’s decision to maintain the interpretation that the 
CCA’s automatic grant of citizenship only applies to individuals who met the 
requirements after February 26, 2001.57 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Extended Previous  
Immigration Standard of Review Reasoning 
Before Duncan v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit had never decided the standard 
of review that the BIA should apply to the CCA’s physical custody require-
ment.58 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit relied on cases with similar issues to 
determine the approach that the BIA should have followed in reviewing the 
IJ’s decision.59 
The court first looked to its 2014 decision in Turkson v. Holder.60 The is-
sue in Turkson was whether the BIA acted in accordance with federal regula-
tions when it reviewed the IJ’s decision to grant deportation relief to petitioner 
James Turkson under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Oth-
er Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.61 The BIA over-
turned the IJ’s decision and made its own determination on what conditions 
                                                                                                                           
of their shared finances, and their credibility related to these details—are factual determinations, 
whereas applying them to determine whether the couple entered a good-faith marriage is a legal 
judgment); Turkson v. Holder 667 F.3d 523, 528–29 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that what happened to 
an immigrant in Ghana, the state of political affairs in Ghana, and what conditions the immigrant 
would likely face if he returned there were factual determinations, whereas whether the treatment he 
faced in Ghana amounted to torture was a legal question). 
 56 See infra notes 58–84 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 58 See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 214 (stating that the appropriate review standard for the CCA’s physi-
cal custody requirement was a matter of first impression for the court). 
 59 See id. at 215 (citing Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 184; Turkson, 667 F.3d at 529) (discussing other 
immigration cases in which there was a mixed question of law and fact). See generally Upatcha, 849 
F.3d at 184 (holding that whether a marriage was in good faith was a mixed question); Turkson, 667 
F.3d at 529 (holding the same for the question of whether an individual faced a threat of torture in his 
country of origin). 
 60 See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 215 (noting that when the IJ faces a mixed question of law and fact, 
such as whether actions amount to torture, the BIA must review the facts at issue with a clear error 
standard and the legal question of whether those facts amount to torture under CAT de novo (citing 
Turkson, 667 F.3d at 529)). 
 61 Turkson, 667 F.3d at 525, 527; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii) (delineating how, when the 
BIA reviews a decision, it must look at factual determinations with a clear error standard and legal ques-
tions with a de novo standard). As a party to the CAT, the United States has agreed not to deport any-
one who is likely to face torture at the hands of or direction of a government officer in the country to 
which the individual would be deported. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85; Turkson, 667 F.3d at 525–26. 
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Turkson would likely face if deported to Ghana.62 The Fourth Circuit over-
turned the BIA’s approach, highlighting that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) divides 
the BIA’s review into a de novo standard for matters of law and a clear error 
standard for matters of fact.63 Further, the court explained that the regulation 
parallels the procedures of other courts in that the trial judge, or in this case the 
IJ, is closest to the facts and the testimony.64 Therefore, the reviewing body 
should defer to the IJ’s factual determinations.65 Accordingly, the BIA erred by 
making its own factual determinations regarding witness testimony and the 
likelihood of future events.66 According to the Fourth Circuit, in reviewing an 
IJ decision, the BIA should have exercised a two-part approach.67 First, it 
should examine factual determinations, such as credibility or predictions, and 
ask only if a clear error was made.68 Second, it can apply the facts to the ques-
tions of law and make its own judgment de novo.69 The court applied this two-
part approach in a new context in Duncan.70 
The Fourth Circuit’s 2017 decision in Upatcha v. Sessions followed Turk-
son’s two-part approach and applied it to a ruling more similar to that in Dun-
can.71 There, the court held that the BIA erroneously reviewed the entire IJ 
decision with a clear error standard even though a question of law existed.72 In 
2009, after the dissolution of her marriage, Petitioner Juraluk Upatcha applied 
for a hardship waiver as a defense to her removal.73 To be successful, she had 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Turkson, 667 F.3d at 528. In its reasoning, the BIA rejected the credibility of Turkson’s testi-
mony, found other evidence more credible, and drew its own conclusions on what Turkson would 
likely face if forced to return to Ghana. Id. 
 63 Id. at 527, 530–31 (remanding the case to the BIA to conduct the appeal in accordance with the 
appropriate review standard). 
 64 Id. at 527. 
 65 See id. (noting that the IJ is in a better position to determine factual questions because the IJ 
observes witnesses and the BIA only reviews a paper transcript of the proceedings). 
 66 See id. at 528 (explaining that the BIA made its own factual determinations, including rejecting 
witness testimony, determining that certain written evidence lacked credibility, and drawing conclu-
sions about the conditions Turkson would face in Ghana). 
 67 Id. at 527. 
 68 Id. at 530. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 215. 
 71 See id. (noting similarities with the ruling in Upatcha); Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 184 (ruling that 
the BIA should have looked at the IJ’s factual determinations with only a clear error, but applied its 
own reasoning, de novo, to the application of those facts to the legal question of whether a marriage 
was in good faith). 
 72 Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 184. 
 73 Id. at 182–83. Upatcha came to the United States as a conditional lawful permanent resident 
based on her engagement to a U.S. citizen. Id. at 182. She and her U.S. citizen partner married shortly 
after her arrival, permitting her to make her conditional resident status permanent after two years of 
marriage if they could show the marriage was legal, they remained together, and they did not marry 
for immigration reasons. Id. at 182–83. Unfortunately, the couple divorced after three months, causing 
Upatcha to lose her conditional status and opening the possibility of her deportation. Id. at 183. A 
hardship waiver granted by the Secretary of Homeland Security would have allowed Upatcha to stay 
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to show that her marriage to a U.S. citizen was in good faith.74 The IJ denied 
the waiver and found that the marriage was not in good faith.75 On appeal, the 
BIA applied the clear error standard and upheld the IJ’s decision, holding that 
whether a good-faith marriage existed was a question of fact, not law.76 The 
Fourth Circuit held that the BIA appropriately looked for clear error regarding 
determinations of credibility, but that it should have then analyzed the legal 
question de novo by exercising discretion and asking how the factual determi-
nations applied to the legal question of good faith.77 Thus, in contrast to Turk-
son, where the BIA applied its discretion too liberally, the Fourth Circuit in 
Upatcha held that the BIA fell short in its appellate capacity.78 
Reviewing a determination of definitional questions invokes the second 
portion of the two-part inquiry, a de novo review of what the court deems a 
legal question.79 The Fourth Circuit in Upatcha saw the definition of a good-
faith marriage as a legal question, similar to the definition of torture in Turk-
son.80 Likewise, in Duncan, the Fourth Circuit saw the definition of physical 
custody as a legal question.81 The definition of custody depends on state law, 
and the court’s example of how two states, Nevada and Montana, view the 
question distinctly highlighted how custody is more than a simple question of 
fact.82 Accordingly, like in Turkson and Upatcha, the court ruled that the BIA 
                                                                                                                           
if she could demonstrate that her deportation would result in extreme hardship and that, despite her 
marriage ending, she had married in good faith. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4); Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 183. 
 74 Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 183. Whether a marriage meets the good-faith standard is a legal question 
guided by federal regulation. Id. at 186–87; 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(2). Factors considered include the 
extent to which the couple merged their finances, how long they lived together after the noncitizen’s 
arrival, any children that the couple has together, and any other factors deemed relevant. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1216.5(e)(2). 
 75 Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 183. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 184.  
 78 Compare id. (holding that the BIA failed to appropriately review the IJ’s decision by not re-
viewing the legal question de novo), with Turkson, 667 F.3d at 528 (holding that the BIA applied the 
wrong standard of review by using its discretion on the factual determination and legal question). 
 79 See Turkson, 667 F.3d at 530 (holding that when analyzing whether actions constitute torture, 
the definition of torture is a legal question and thus subject to de novo review). 
 80 Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 185; Turkson, 667 F.3d at 526. 
 81 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 215–16. Whether an individual meets the physical custody requirement is 
a mixed question of law and fact. Id. The definition of physical custody is a legal question; mean-
while, the individual’s circumstances that contribute to whether the individual satisfies the definition 
are questions of fact. Id. at 215–17. 
 82 See id. at 216–17. (comparing Montana’s view of what qualifies as custody to Nevada’s). Mon-
tana sees child custody as such a fundamental right that a parent in prison may still have custody over 
a child if the parent maintains a certain level of connection with the child and control over the child’s 
life. See id. at 216 (citing Girard v. Williams, 966 P.2d 1155, 1158–59 (Mont. 1998) (describing cus-
tody as a fundamental, constitutional right in Montana)); id. (citing Henderson v. Henderson, 568 P.2d 
177, 179 (Mont. 1977) (describing how custody in Montana does not require actual physical control of 
the child)). In other words, custody in Montana is not easily abdicated. See id. at 216. Meanwhile, in 
Nevada, a parent must physically live with a child to maintain custody, and thus if one moves away 
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should have taken a two-part approach to its review.83 First, the BIA should 
have examined the facts related to the father’s physical custody for clear error, 
and then it should have examined the definition of physical custody to which 
the facts applied with a de novo standard.84 
B. The Fourth Circuit Reaffirmed That Meeting the Requirements of the 
CCA Prior to Its Effective Date Does Not Grant Automatic Citizenship 
In the three months that Duncan lived with his father in the United States 
prior to his father’s incarceration, he arguably met all of the requirements for 
automatic citizenship under the CCA.85 The Fourth Circuit, however, held that 
it was only relevant if Duncan met the requirements between February 27, 
2001, when the law went into effect, and October 17, 2009, when Duncan 
turned eighteen years old.86 Federal regulations after the passage of the CCA 
indicated that the law was not meant to apply to individuals who met the re-
quirements for citizenship prior to the law’s effective date.87 
The analysis of the CCA’s applicability to individuals who met the re-
quirements prior to the law’s effective date centers on the statute’s “as in ef-
fect” clause.88 In June 2001, in Nehme v. I.N.S., the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the CCA explicitly conveyed Congress’s intent and that to ap-
ply the law retroactively would make the “as in effect” clause meaningless.89 
Further, the court stated that no evidence existed indicating that Congress in-
tended the law to apply to individuals who met the requirements prior to the 
                                                                                                                           
from the other for a period of time, Nevada law is unlikely to view the child as in the custody of the 
parent. See id. at 216–17 (presenting the example of a child who spends the school year with one 
parent and summer vacation with another to show that Nevada law will no longer consider the parent 
with whom the child lives during the school year to have custody over the child during the summer).  
 83 Id. at 215; see Upatcha, 849 F.3d at 185; Turkson, 667 F.3d at 527. 
 84 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 215. 
 85 See 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (requiring a child to have at least one parent that is a U.S. citizen, to be 
in the legal and physical custody of that parent, and to be under eighteen years old); Duncan, 919 F.3d 
at 211–12 (describing Duncan’s father as an American, and later confirming that his U.S. citizenship 
status was not in dispute and that when Duncan was six years old, he lived with his father in the Unit-
ed States for three months). Duncan lived with his father for the three months preceding April 1998. 
Duncan, 919 F.3d at 211. The CCA went into effect on February 27, 2001. Id. at 212. 
 86 8 C.F.R. § 320.2; Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212. 
 87 8 C.F.R. § 320.2; see Nehme v. I.N.S., 252 F.3d 415, 430–33 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
plain language of the statute and legislative intent clearly show that the CCA sought only to provide 
citizenship to individuals who met the criteria after the law’s effective date); In re Rodriguez-Tejedor, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 153, 159–61 (BIA 2001) (holding that the language of the statute is ambiguous but 
that the legislative history shows Congress did not intend the CCA to apply retroactively). 
 88 See Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, § 104, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000) (stating 
that the provisions of the Act apply to individuals who meet the “requirements of Section 320 or 322 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on such effective date” (emphasis added)); Neh-
me, 252 F.3d at 431(grounding the analysis in the “as in effect” language of the CCA); Rodriguez-
Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 167 (same). 
 89 Nehme, 252 F.3d at 431. 
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law going into effect.90 Then, in July 2001, in In re Rodriguez-Tejedor, the BIA 
agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s holding but distinguished its reasoning.91 The 
BIA held that the statutory language is ambiguous and thus looked to the legis-
lative history, but still found no evidence that the drafters intended for the law to 
apply to those who had previously met the elements for automatic citizenship.92 
Accordingly, the BIA held in line with the Fifth Circuit, and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service subsequently issued a rule aligning with these interpreta-
tions.93 This left a portion of the population targeted by the CCA—adults who 
met its requirements as children but not on the effective date—outside of its 
reach.94 Duncan, having met the requirements for automatic citizenship three 
years prior to the effective date, but not after, represents one such individual.95 
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT SET THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR REVIEW  
BUT EXPOSED FLAWS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CCA 
In 2019, in Duncan v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals appropri-
ately ruled that the BIA erroneously used a clear error standard to review 
whether Duncan was in his father’s physical custody and that it should have 
used a blended standard based on the mixed question of fact and law.96 This 
ruling reflects the standards that non-immigration appellate courts use when 
reviewing trial court determinations and thus ensures the protections that moti-
vate these review standards.97 An IJ, like a trial judge, is closest to the testimo-
ny and evidence presented, and therefore is in the best position to make factual 
determinations.98 Moreover, the purpose of an appellate body, like the BIA, is 
to provide an independent determination on legal matters, such as whether a 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. at 432. 
 91 See Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 155, 159. (recognizing that the decision in Nehme 
was binding and holding in accordance with it, but offering different reasoning, namely that the lan-
guage pertaining to the effective date is ambiguous). 
 92 Id. at 160–61. 
 93 8 C.F.R. § 320.2 (codifying the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulation that an 
individual must meet the requirements of the CCA after its effective date to qualify for automatic citizen-
ship); see Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 155–56 (recognizing that the Fifth Circuit already 
decided on the issue and that the INS issued an interim rule that required the BIA to hold that individ-
uals must meet the CCA requirements after its effective date). 
 94 See Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 168–69 (citing to statements by the bill’s key draft-
er, Representative Delahunt, that emphasize that the problem the bill sought to address was adults 
facing deportation because their parents, unbeknownst to them, failed to naturalize them when they 
were children).  
 95 Duncan, 919 F.3d at 211–12. 
 96 Duncan v. Barr, 919 F.3d 209, 217 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 97 See Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing how the BIA’s de novo 
and clear error review standards protect the IJ’s role as a factfinder given the IJ’s proximity to the case 
in a role that mirrors that of a trial judge). 
 98 Id.  
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set of facts amounts to physical custody.99 By deciding this question in accord-
ance with similar immigration decisions, as well as with basic appellate princi-
ples, the Fourth Circuit ensured custody determinations within the CCA re-
ceive fair and adequate review on appeal.100 
Less discussed in the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, but prominent in its ef-
fect, is the validity of past interpretations regarding the CCA’s retroactive ap-
plication, which have since been formalized into regulation.101 In construing 
the CCA to only apply to individuals who met its requirements on or after it 
went into effect on February 27, 2001, case law and regulations that give the 
statute effect misinterpret it and contravene its original purpose.102 In 2001, in 
Nehme v. I.N.S., the petitioner argued before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
that legislative history shows Congress intended relief for children and adults 
who met the requirements for automatic citizenship as children.103 The Fifth 
Circuit disagreed and held that the statutory language clearly establishes that 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See id. (describing how the BIA, as an appellate body, should only overturn factual determina-
tions if an unambiguous error was made, although it can make independent determinations on legal 
matters); see also Duncan, 919 F.3d at 217 (depicting examples of how the BIA would have to take 
the same set of facts and make different legal determinations in its appellate capacity based on the 
relevant law in a given state). 
 100 See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991) (discussing the role of appel-
late courts and how, by considering legal questions de novo, they improve the accuracy of courts’ 
decisions); Duncan, 919 F.3d at 217 (holding that the BIA should have analyzed the legal components 
of the physical custody question de novo, and the factual components with a clear error standard). 
 101 See 8 C.F.R. § 320.2 (codifying that individuals must have established all of the CCA’s re-
quirements after February 26, 2001, or, in other words, on or after the law’s effective date of February 
27, 2001); see also Nehme v. I.N.S., 252 F.3d 415, 430–33 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the statute’s 
language and intent indicate that the CCA was only meant to automatically provide citizenship to 
individuals who established its requirements on or after its effective date); In re Rodriguez-Tejedor, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 153, 159–61 (BIA 2001) (holding that the legislative history shows Congress did not 
intend the CCA to apply to individuals over eighteen after the effective date). 
 102 See 8 C.F.R. § 320.2 (stating that an individual must meet the delineated conditions on or after 
February 27, 2001); see also Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212 (following 8 C.F.R. § 320.2 and holding that the 
CCA would have only applied to Duncan if he met the conditions on or after February 27, 2001 and 
before his eighteenth birthday); Nehme, 252 F.3d at 430–33 (holding that the language of the CCA is 
not ambiguous and clearly requires that an individual meet its conditions on or after February 27, 
2001, to qualify for citizenship); Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 159 (holding that the language 
of the CCA is ambiguous, but that legislative intent confirms an individual cannot be older than eight-
een on or after February 27, 2001, and receive automatic citizenship). In contrast to these determina-
tions, the Congressional Record shows that the bill’s supporters intended to address the problem of 
adults who were not naturalized as children and that it should apply “automatically and retroactively.” 
See 146 CONG. REC. H7774, 7776–78 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statements of Rep. Smith and Rep. 
Delahunt) (highlighting stories of adults who faced deportation because of the previous administrative 
hurdles for gaining citizenship for children born abroad as the problem that the CCA’s grant of auto-
matic citizenship seeks to address). Further, the only objection to retroactive application concerned 
granting citizenship retroactively to the time of an individual’s birth, not allowing individuals to have 
met the bill’s requirements prior to February 27, 2001. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 5 (2000) (ex-
pressing concerns by the Department of State and the Department of Justice that retroactively granting 
citizenship to the time of an individual’s birth could cause legal and foreign relations issues). 
 103 Nehme, 252 F.3d at 431. 
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an individual must meet the requirements after the effective date.104 The stat-
ute’s clarity, however, is questionable.105 The phrase “as in effect” may mean 
that an individual must meet the requirements at or after February 27, 2001, or 
merely that citizenship becomes in effect after that date.106 
When the statutory language contains ambiguity, such as that presented in 
the “as in effect” clause, courts should look to Congress’s intent.107 In this in-
stance, legislative history shows that Congress only intended citizenship to go 
into effect on February 27, 2001, but that it would apply to individuals who 
met the requirements as of the effective date as well as those who met them in 
the past.108 In In re Rodriguez-Tejedor, decided shortly after the CCA’s pas-
sage, the BIA noted that Congress incorporated the “as in effect” provision 
because of clear concerns about the law operating retroactively that the De-
partment of State and the Department of Justice raised.109 The legislative histo-
                                                                                                                           
 104 Id.; see 114 Stat. 1631 (2000) (stating that the Act applies to individuals who meet its criteria 
“as in effect on such effective date”). 
 105 See Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, § 104, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000) (stating 
that an individual receives automatic citizenship if the individual meets the “requirements of Section 
320 or 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on such effective date”); Rodriguez-
Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 159 (holding in accord with the Fifth Circuit in Nehme, but rejecting the 
argument that the plain language of the statute is clear). 
 106 114 Stat. 1631 (2000). Compare Nehme, 252 F.3d at 431–32 (holding that an individual must 
meet all requirements of the CCA on or after the effective date in order for that individual to gain 
automatic citizenship), with Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 167–68 (Rosenberg, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (asserting that an individual may have met the Act’s requirements prior to 
the effective date and that the individual still gains citizenship under the Act, but that it only goes into 
effect on or after the effective date). 
 107 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (holding that, when interpreting a statute, a 
court must first look to the statute’s plain language, but if it remains unclear, then the court can look to 
the legislature’s intent); Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 159–60 (explaining that when the plain 
language of a statute is not clear, courts must look to other tools of statutory interpretation, including 
legislative history). 
 108 See Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 168–69 (Rosenberg, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (arguing that both a plain language reading of the statute and the legislative history sup-
ported granting citizenship as of the effective date to individuals who met the statute’s criteria in the 
past, and clarifying that this is distinct from granting citizenship retroactively to begin on the date in 
which all of the criteria were met); H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 5, 9–13 (highlighting that the Executive 
Departments’ only concerns were with granting citizenship to retroactively begin at the individual’s 
date of birth); 146 CONG. REC. H7774, 7776–78 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statements of Rep. Smith 
and Rep. Delahunt) (emphasizing that a focus of the Act was correcting the injustices towards adult 
children of U.S. citizens who failed to obtain citizenship as children because of unknown technicali-
ties). 
 109 See Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 161 (noting that the legislative history shows Con-
gress adapted the bill to conform with concerns that the Department of State and the Department of 
Justice raised (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 106-852 at 5, 9–13)). The Department of State and Department 
of Justice expressed concerns about the CCA granting citizenship to begin retroactively at the time of 
an individual’s birth. H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 5. Specifically, these fears included individuals 
claiming reimbursement for rights they would have had as citizens, but were denied because they were 
not citizens at the time. Id. at 10. Additionally, they were concerned about conflicts that the retroactive 
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ry, however, shows that their concern was narrower.110 The congressional in-
tent behind the “as in effect” clause was to ameliorate the Executive Depart-
ments’ concerns by ensuring that people did not retroactively become citizens 
at birth and that their citizenship only goes into effect at the time the bill did, 
or anytime thereafter when the CCA’s requirements were met.111 Further, the 
statements of Representative Delahunt, a key drafter of the bill, show that the 
overall statutory scheme aimed to help the foreign-born children of U.S. citi-
zens, adopted or biological, who faced deportation as adults because, unbe-
knownst to them, their parents did not take the final steps to naturalize them.112 
On the House floor, Representative Delahunt told the story of John Gaul 
who, at twenty-five years old, faced deportation to a country he had never 
known because his parents never naturalized him, as they were unaware that it 
was necessary in light of all the administrative actions they had taken to adopt 
John and bring him to the United States.113 The CCA aimed to grant individu-
als like Gaul citizenship to prevent horrible consequences coming from mere 
bureaucratic error or parental oversight.114 Likewise, had Duncan come to live 
with his father after February 27, 2001, he would have automatically acquired 
citizenship upon residing with him.115 The parallels between John Gaul and 
Howard Duncan are stark, and the proposition that the CCA was written with-
                                                                                                                           
granting of citizenship might create with the countries who claimed these individuals as citizens at the 
time of their birth. Id. 
 110 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-852, at 5, 9–13 (detailing that the Executive Departments were only 
concerned with declaring individuals who met the requirements later in life to be U.S. citizens from 
the time of their birth, rather than from the time that they met the requirements). 
 111 See id.; Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 161 at 168–69 (Rosenberg, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (explaining that legislative intent shows that Congress added the “as in effect” 
clause to address the concerns of the Executive Departments and members of Congress regarding 
retroactively granting citizenship to the time of birth). 
 112 See 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (describ-
ing the injustice created by a system in which parents erroneously think their adopted child is a U.S. 
citizen). 
 113 Id. The Gaul family adopted John from Thailand when he was four years old. Id. His adopted 
parents obtained a U.S. birth certificate for him, and he grew up in Florida. Id. After serving prison 
time for auto theft and bounced checks, however, he was deported back to Thailand when he was 
twenty-five years old. Schmitt, supra note 32. He never knew Thailand as his home and could not 
even speak Thai. Id. For all intents and purposes, the United States was his home, yet because his 
parents failed to naturalize him, he lacked the protections of a full U.S. citizen. 146 CONG. REC. 
H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt). 
 114 See 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (asserting 
that individuals like John Gaul have faced “heartbreaking injustices” and that “[t]hey are our children, 
and we are responsible for them”). 
 115 See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 211–12 (implying that had Duncan first come to the United States 
after the CCA’s effective date, he would have been in the legal and physical custody of his father 
during the relevant time period and thus obtained automatic citizenship). 
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out the intent of helping the very cases cited as motivating its passage borders 
on absurd.116 
Although the Fourth Circuit appropriately viewed the CCA’s physical 
custody requirement as a mixed question of law and fact, this would not have 
been necessary if the CCA was applied as it was intended.117 Unfortunately, 
the regulations and decisions preceding Duncan, which give the statute effect, 
contravene its original purpose.118 In Duncan, the Fourth Circuit had the op-
portunity to address the issue of the misinterpreted and misapplied effective 
date provision but failed to do so.119 The CCA was meant to grant citizenship 
to the children of U.S. citizens automatically in order to protect them from be-
ing blindsided by discovering they lacked citizenship later in life.120 The Act 
sought to remove entirely the technicalities that unfairly left U.S. citizens’ 
children without citizenship, not remove one technicality and replace it with 
another.121 Because Duncan was in his father’s physical custody for three 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See id. at 211–12; 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. De-
lahunt) (citing Gaul’s story as an example of the motivation for the CCA). Both John Gaul and How-
ard Duncan came to the United States as young children, the former as an adopted child of a U.S. 
citizen and the latter as a biological child of a U.S. citizen. Duncan, 919 F.3d at 211; 146 CONG. REC. 
H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt). Both grew up with the United States 
as their homes and only upon the commission of crimes as young adults did their lack of citizenship 
emerge to add unforeseen severity to the consequences of their crimes—deportation to countries 
largely unknown to them. See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212 (discussing the facts of Duncan’s case); 146 
CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (discussing the facts of 
Gaul’s case). John Gaul was deported in 1999. Schmitt, supra note 32. His story is cited as a reason 
for drafting the CCA, yet the regulation that enables the law prevents it from helping him, Howard 
Duncan, and others like them from the injustice of deportation to homes that they have never known. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 320.2 (requiring that individuals meet all prongs of the CCA after February 26, 2001, in 
order to qualify for automatic citizenship); Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 161 at 168–69 (Ros-
enberg, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing, in opposition to 8 C.F.R. § 320.2, that the 
plain language of the CCA supports granting citizenship to individuals with situations similar to those 
for whom Representative Delahunt expressed concern); 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 
2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (citing the injustices against John Gaul as motivating the drafting 
and passage of the CCA). 
 117 See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 217 (analyzing the standard of review that the BIA should have ap-
plied to the “physical custody” question rather than recognizing that Duncan met the requirements 
under an appropriate reading of the CCA). 
 118 Compare 8 C.F.R. § 320.2 (stating that an individual must meet all conditions of the CCA after 
February 26, 2001 to qualify for citizenship under the Act), with 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 
19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (describing the bill as addressing the “heartbreaking injustic-
es” similar to those that befell two men aged twenty-five and twenty-two who faced deportation be-
cause they were not naturalized when brought to the United States after their adoption). Under the 
reading adopted in 8 C.F.R. § 320.2, these individuals who represent the problem the bill sought to ad-
dress would not benefit from it, because they were over eighteen as of February 26, 2001. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 320.2; 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt). 
 119 See Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 320.2) (dismissing implicitly that Duncan could 
derive citizenship from meeting the CCA’s requirements prior to February 26, 2001). 
 120 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt). 
 121 See id. (explaining the purpose of the Act as streamlining the citizenship process for the chil-
dren of U.S. citizens). 
II.-262 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
months before his father was arrested, he should have citizenship under the 
CCA and therefore be ineligible for removable.122 
Given the flawed interpretation of the CCA in its corresponding regula-
tions and subsequent case law, Congress should correct and clarify the Act.123 
Legislative efforts introduced in 2019 focus on correcting this loophole, but 
because of their emphasis on adoptees and those who did not meet the age re-
quirement by the effective date, individuals in situations like Duncan’s remain 
at risk.124 Fair legislation would ensure that all “our foreign-born sons and 
daughters . . . have the benefits of citizenship when they arrive on our shores” 
in accordance with the original intention of the bill’s drafters and the bipartisan 
support it received.125 
CONCLUSION 
Family reunification and family-focused policies have been a bedrock of 
the U.S. immigration system for much of the past half century. Both humani-
tarian justifications and more practical reasons support such policies. Individu-
als often value family above all else, and for recent arrivals, family serves as a 
powerful support system in their transition into life in a new country. 
The value our country has historically placed on the family unit in the 
immigration system is reflected in the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, which 
sought to better safeguard families from separation due to oversight or bureau-
cratic missteps from decades prior. Unfortunately, the size of the population 
who could benefit from the legislation was sharply curtailed by an arguably 
erroneous interpretation and subsequent rule passage that left many of the in-
dividuals the law sought to protect without recourse. Howard Duncan is one 
such individual. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rightly held that the BIA 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (stating that deportation as the punishment for committing criminal 
offenses applies to aliens, not citizens); Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212 (showing that Duncan met all re-
quirements of the CCA when he first moved to the United States with his father but not after February 
26, 2001). 
 123 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 124 See H.R. 2731, 116th Cong. (2019) (as referred to the Subcomm. on Immigration and Citizen-
ship, June 26, 2019) (proposing that the CCA’s grant of automatic citizenship apply to individuals 
who met all requirements before the effective date, but were over eighteen years old as of that date); 
Simons, supra note 35 (describing how the proposed legislation would allow individuals who met all 
of the CCA’s requirements but were adults at the time of its passage to take advantage of its grant of 
automatic citizenship). Duncan was under eighteen when the bill passed, but he was no longer in his 
father’s physical custody. Duncan, 919 F.3d at 212. As a result, he met the age requirement under the 
current interpretation of the Act but not the physical custody requirement. Id. The new bill specifically 
focuses on individuals who met the age requirement in the past but no longer did at the time of the 
bill’s passage. H.R. 2731; Simons, supra note 35. It does not, however, address those who no longer 
met other attendant circumstances, such as the physical custody requirement, even though they also 
had met them in the past. H.R. 2731; Simons, supra note 35. 
 125 See 146 CONG. REC. H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt). 
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applied the wrong standard of review and that it should have analyzed the 
mixed question of fact and law with a two-part clear error and de novo stand-
ard of review. The court appropriately remanded Duncan’s case to the BIA in 
light of its holding. But, because of how case law and regulations have inter-
preted the Child Citizenship Act, his path remains highly uncertain and suscep-
tible to deportation to a country he has never known. In a moment when family 
separation at the U.S.-Mexico border and heated debates about chain migration 
prompt questions about the degree to which the United States values and re-
spects families in the context of immigration, Congress should take this oppor-
tunity to strengthen the Child Citizenship Act and ensure that it meets its origi-
nal purpose: to protect the children of citizens, regardless of age, and ensure 
that this country remains their home. 
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